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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on 
international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those 
developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the 
years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 
International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external 
relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in 
international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a 
somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international 
organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions 
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5
 With the notable exception of N. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International 
Organizations and European Law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004, this topic has received 
relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it 
can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international 
bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon 
has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations 
of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference 
between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such 
as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing 
competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the 
hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of 
them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. 
 
This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international 
organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do 
not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be 
it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) 
bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils 
established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others 
operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international 
organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European 
Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by 
these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any 
normative output of international institutional arrangements. 
 
2. ‘International Decisions’: The Changing Role of International 
Organizations 
 
Assessing the status of decisions of international organizations as a separate 
category in the EU’s legal order implies that these decisions can be a source of law. 
Whereas treaties (international agreements) and custom are undisputed as sources 
of international law and are as such also mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the role and function of decisions of international 
organizations in international law is less clear. Yet, by now the notion that 
international organizations can take decisions and that these decisions may be 
legally binding is well-accepted.8 International organizations have found their place in 
global governance,9 and are even considered ‘autonomous actors’, following an 
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 International organizations can be defined in many ways. The most recent definition laid down in an 
international legal document may very well be the one of the International Law Commission in the 2011 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (see below), which defined an international 
organization as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international 
law and possessing its own international legal personality. International organizations may include as 
members, in addition to States, other entities.” See more extensively S. Bouwhuis, ‘The International law 
Commission’s Definition of International Organizations’, International Organizations Law Review, 2012, 
pp. 451–465. The definition by Schermers and Blokker is also commonly used: “international 
organizations are defined as forms of cooperation (1) founded on an international agreement; (2) having 
at least one organ with a will of its own; and (3) established under international law.” H.G. Schermers 
and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011, at p. 37. 
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 Schermers and Blokker, op.cit., at p. 832 et seq. 
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 I.F. Dekker and R.A. Wessel, ‘Governance by International Organisations: Rethinking the Source and 
Normative Force of International Decisions’, in I.F. Dekker and W. Werner (Eds.), Governance and 
International Legal Theory, Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 215-236. 
agenda that is no longer fully defined by their Member States,10 which has caused 
the latter to devote much of their time and energy to responding to what has been 
termed the ‘Frankenstein problem’.11 
 
There is nothing new in arguing that international organizations engage in decision-
making in a sense that can even be viewed as ‘law-making’.12 Apart from the fact that 
states (but also the EU) may use international organizations as frameworks for 
treaty-making, it is well-accepted that also many decisions of international 
organizations can be seen as ‘law’.13 Institutional law-making has moved beyond the 
traditional methods and actors and is increasingly studied in a broader sense, 
including new actors and new regulatory activities.14 
The role of many international institutions developed well beyond a ‘facilitation 
forum’, underlining their autonomous position in the global legal order.15 In those 
cases law-making takes place on the basis of well-defined procedures with an 
involvement of institutional actors other than states, but also on the basis of a 
sometimes dynamic interpretation of the original law-making mandate of the 
organization.16 Indeed, the outcome comes closer to a decision of an international 
organization than to an international agreement concluded between states. In fact, it 
could be argued that this is what ‘institutional law-making’ is all about: it is law-
making by international institutions (be it formal international organizations or other 
international bodies17) and less about law-making through international institutions 
(although the latter continues to exist in the form of for instance Conferences of 
States Parties of multilateral conventions or bodies set up by these conventions).18  It 
has even become quite common to regard these types of acts as contributing to the 
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 N.D. White and R. Collins (Eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional 
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Law-Makers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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Independence in the International Legal Order, London/New York: Routledge, 2011. 
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 J. Wouters and Ph. De Man, ‘International Organizations as Law-Makers’, in J. Klabbers and Å. 
Wallendahl (Eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations, 
Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, pp. 190-224 at 192: “It is possible […] that 
the treaty provisions pertaining to the law-making powers of the organization will be construed in a 
different way than was originally intended by the drafting nations, as it proves very difficult to draft an 
instrument in such a manner as to effectively preclude any other possible interpretation.” 
17
 Cf. for instance M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Law-making and International Environmental Law: the legal 
Character of Decisions of Conference of the Parties’, in R. Liijova and J. Petman (Eds.), International 
Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers, London/New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 190-210; and 
in the same volume G. Ulfstein, ‘Law-making by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, pp. 249-257. 
18
 See more extensively R.A. Wessel, ‘Institutional Law-Making: The Development of a Global 
Normative Web’, in C. Bröllman and Y. Radi (Eds.), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of 
International Law-Making, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014 See on these two 
dimensions of international organizations J. Klabbers, `Two Concepts of International Organization’, 
International Organizations Law Review, 2005, pp. 277-293; as well as his ‘Contending Approaches to 
International Organizations: Between Functionalism and Constitutionalism’, in Klabbers and Wallendahl, 
op.cit., pp. 3-30. 
development of ‘world legislation’.19 Yet, situations clearly differ. While some 
international organizations are well-established and display ‘autonomous’ powers, in 
other cases institutionalisation is ‘light’ and serves as an ad hoc vehicle for a 
multilateral diplomatic process. In these cases  conferences are not much more that 
meeting points, facilitating states to conclude treaties.20 Similar processes also take 
place within more permanent structures, including formal international organizations. 
Obvious examples include the UN General Assembly21 and the UN specialised 
agencies.22 In these cases an important function of international organizations is to 
reveal state practice (and opinio juris23) and to allow for a speedy creation of 
customary law, although one needs to remain aware of the distinction between state 
practice and the practice of an international organization.24 Furthermore, the fact that 
many international conventions incorporate generally accepted international rules, 
standards, regulations, procedures and/or practices may effectively transform a 
number of codes, guidelines and standards created by international organizations 
and bodies into binding norms. This reveals the complexity of institutional decision-
making: it is not just about clearly legally binding decisions of international 
organizations; it may very well be about an acceptance of rules and standards 
because there is simply nothing else and the rules need to be followed in order for 
states to be able to play along. At the same time international organizations often 
adopt rules or standards developed in another organization and with less than 200 
states they are bound to run into each other in many different institutions. 
‘International decisions’ may perhaps also take shape in the form of ‘case law’ rather 
than as decisions of an organ of an international organization. The legal order of the 
European Union has largely been shaped on the basis of case law that, allegedly, 
went beyond what states originally (though to have) agreed on in the treaties. Less 
prominent examples may be found in other international organizations. Thus, the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has been said to be proof of the 
organization’s ‘legislative’ or ‘adjudicative’ powers.25 
Finally, the set of international institutions encompasses not only formal international 
organizations, but also other international bodies, consisting of governmental 
representatives and/or other stakeholders. There are indications that these 
international decisions outnumber the traditional forms.26 In the study of institutional 
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 See the different contributions to the forum on ‘World Legislation’ in International Organizations Law 
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development of international law and its codification”. 
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 Cf. the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the treat or use of nuclear weapons[1996] ICJ Rep. 
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 Wouters and De Man, op.cit. at 207-208. Once consensus has been reached within an international 
organization, it will be difficult for states to deny their acceptance of a norm and to be recognised as a 
‘persistent objector’. See for the decision-making powers of many international organizations and other 
international bodies: J. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
25
 See in particular N. Lavranos: Decisions of International Organizations in the European and Domestic 
Legal Orders of Selected EU Member States, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004. 
26
 See J. Pauwelyn, J. Wouters and R.A. Wessel, ‘When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and 
Dynamics in International Lawmaking’, European Journal of International Law, 2014; but also Pauwelyn, 
Wessel and Wouters (Eds.), Informal International Lawmaking, op.cit. 
decision-making it became clear that many norms originate in other international 
bodies or form part of a much broader international debate, including many different 
actors. The emerging picture is one of a broad range of international normative fora, 
from intergovernmental organizations with a broad mandate (see above), treaty-
based conferences that do not amount to an international organization (e.g. 
Conferences of the Parties under the main multilateral environmental agreements, 
such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol), 
informal intergovernmental co-operative structures (e.g. the G20, the Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), 
and even private organizations that are active in the public domain (e.g. the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), or private regulation of the 
internet by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), The 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the Internet Society (ISOC).27  
   
Given the EU’s connection to all these different formal and informal normative 
processes, the question is to which extent international decisions impact the EU’s 
legal order. The following sections will address this question in more detail. 
 
3. The EU Treaties and International Organizations 
 
Apart from changes in the roles of international organizations, the relation between 
the EU and international organizations has also changed. From a political science 
perspective Jørgensen pointed to the idea that “reactive policies have been left 
behind […]. [W]hereas the European Union in the past may have been an 
organization in need of learning about international affairs, the European Union now 
seems to master several of the disciplines of international relations.”28 And, as will be 
highlighted below: there seems to be a ‘two-way flow of influence’ which includes 
both an instrumental use by the EU of international organizations and an influence of 
international organizations on EU policies and policy-making.29 
The current EU Treaties reflect this new interest in international organizations (see 
below). Apart from its participation in a number of actual international organizations, 
the institutionalization of the role of the EU in the world is reflected in its position in 
international regimes in various policy fields, either as a full member or as an 
observer.30 The position of the EU in international institutions is part and parcel of EU 
external relations law and it is at these fora that a structural role of the EU in global 
governance becomes most visible. Moreover, it is this role that has become more 
interesting now that it becomes clear that many EU (and national) rules find their 
origin in decision-making processes in other international organizations. 
It is generally held that the participation in a formal international organization relates 
to the participation in its organs; i.e. the right to attend the meetings, being elected for 
functions in the organ, and exercising voting and speaking rights. In that sense the 
term influence is related to the output of the international organization (UN, ICAO, 
etc.): decisions (often recommendations, in some occasions binding decisions) and 
conventions (international agreements prepared and adopted by an organ of an 
international organization). In addition the EU participates in less formal international 
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 More extensively on the normative activities of these bodies: R.A. Wessel, ‘Regulating Technological 
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Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: 
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institutions (or regimes) such as the G-20 for example. The Treaties herald an 
increase of the engagement of the EU in other international institutions, including the 
future membership of additional international organizations such as the Council of 
Europe (Article 6 TEU).  
The absence of a clear and explicit competence means that the participation in (and 
the membership of) international institutions is predominantly based on implied 
powers, which find their source in the general competences the Union enjoys in the 
different policy fields. Thus, the Union’s membership of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) is based on the Articles 43 TFEU (agriculture and fisheries), 207 
TFEU (commercial policy) and 209 TFEU (development cooperation). However, as 
we will see below, there are specific policy areas where cooperation with 
international organizations is expressly incorporated into the TFEU.  
What comes closest to a general competence-conferring provision is Article 211 
TFEU: “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member 
States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international 
organisations.” That this ‘cooperation’ may also lead to the establishment of legal 
relationships can be derived from the provisions creating a competence for the Union 
to conclude international agreements. Article 216(1) TFEU also refers to international 
organizations: “The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third 
countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of 
the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided 
for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their 
scope.”. And Article 217 TFEU adds: “The Union may conclude with one or more 
third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.” 
The procedures to conclude these international agreements are to be found in 
Articles 218 and 219(3) TFEU. So called, ‘constitutive agreements’ by which new 
international organizations are created, or accession agreements to acquire 
membership of an international organization are not excluded. In fact, in Opinion 1/76 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established that the EU’s 
competences in the field of external relation included the power to create new 
international organizations.31 Both the European Economic Area (EEA) and the 
‘associations’ created by association agreements serve as examples of international 
organizations created by (at that time) the European Community. At the same time, 
in Opinion 1/94 the Court implicitly accepted a role of the EU as one of the founding 
members of the WTO. Although not explicitly regulated, this also seems to imply a 
competence of the EU to fully participate in so-called ‘treaty-regimes’, on the basis of 
a formal accession to a treaty (e.g. the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which were formally ratified by the European Union 
in 1993 and 2002 respectively). As in formal international organizations, participation 
of the EU is either based on decisions by the participating states to grant the EU 
observer or full participant status, or on the inclusion of a Regional Economic 
Integration Organization (REIO) clause in international conventions.32 For example, 
Article II of the FAO Constitution was specifically modified to allow for the accession 
of ‘regional economic organizations’. A REIO is commonly defined in UN protocols 
and conventions as “an organization constituted by sovereign states of a given region 
to which its Member States have transferred competence in respect of matters 
governed by […] convention or its protocols and [which] has been duly authorised, in 
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 Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels 
[1977] ECR 741, par. 5. 
32
 See on the qualification of the EU as an international (integration) organization also C. Eckes and 
R.A. Wessel, ‘The European Union: An International Perspective’, in T. Tridimas and R. Schütze (Eds.), 
The Oxford Principles of European Union Law − Volume 1: The European Union Legal Order, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to 
it [the instruments concerned].”.33 In the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, the REIO clause seems to have evolved to a RIO (Regional 
Integration Organization) clause, which does justice to the large scope of activities of 
the EU these days. In Article 44 of that Convention, a “’Regional integration 
organization’ shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given 
region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of 
matters governed by this Convention.” Since Member States usually have retained 
certain competences, ‘mixed agreements’ are the appropriate instrument for the EU 
and its Member States to engage in international institutions in which both participate 
fully.  
Express competences are not always needed for the EU to join an international 
organization by concluding an international agreement. It is well known that, ever 
since the 1971 ERTA case, the CJEU also acknowledged the treaty-making capacity 
of the Union in cases where this was not explicitly provided for by the Treaty. This 
means that international agreements, including the ones whereby the EU becomes a 
member of another international organization or participates in a treaty-regime 
(Opinion 1/94 WTO), may also be based on the external dimension of an internal 
competence. This is also confirmed by Article 216(1) TFEU, which – as we have 
seen − explicitly refers to international organizations: “The Union may conclude an 
agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations […].”  At 
least to establish membership of the EU in international organizations, this provision 
seems to give a broad mandate to the EU to also conclude international agreements 
in order to become a member of an international organization or to join a treaty-
regime.  
Irrespective of these more general indications of a competence to engage in 
international institutions, the Treaties explicitly refer to a number of specific policy 
terrains or international organizations. Thus, Article 37 TEU allows for international 
agreements to be concluded “with one or more states or international organizations” 
in the area of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Similar provisions may 
be found in relation to development cooperation (Art. 209(2) TFEU), economic, 
financial and technical cooperation (Art. 212(3) TFEU) and humanitarian aid (Art. 
214(4) TFEU).  In the environmental sphere, the Treaty reads that “Within their 
respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States shall 
cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations” 
(Article 191(4) TFEU). In the field of humanitarian aid, the Treaty refers to 
“international organizations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United 
Nations system” to coordinate operations with (Art. 214(7) TFEU). The United 
Nations (and its Charter) is also mentioned in relation to a number of other policy 
areas of the Union (Articles 3(5) TEU, 21(1-2) TEU, 34(2) TEU, 42(1 and 7) TEU, 
208(2) TFEU, 214(7) TFEU, and 220(1) TFEU) (see also below). In relation to 
development cooperation a number of provisions have been included to strengthen 
explicitly commitments of both the Union and its Member States in that area. Thus, 
Article 208(2) TFEU provides the following: “The Union and the Member States shall 
comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved 
in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations.” 
Article 210(1) TFEU adds to that an obligation of coordination, which means 
concretely that the EU and Member States must take account of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), and their planned post-2015 follow-up (‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’ or SDGs), drawn up in the context of the United Nations. In 
addition one may come across some references in relation to the European Central 
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 See for instance Articles 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5, 21 and 22 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Bank and the European Investment Bank (see Protocols Nos. 434 and 5 to the Treaty 
(Article 14)). A somewhat more general provision, and the first one in a specific 
Treaty Title on ‘The Union’s Relations with International Organisations and Third 
Countries and Union Delegations’ is Art. 220(1) TFEU: “The Union shall establish all 
appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The Union shall also maintain such relations as are appropriate with 
other international organisations.” 
This short overview reveals that the competences of the EU in relation to 
international institutions are fragmented and scattered across the Treaties. Apart 
from these competences of the EU itself, many of the provisions relate to 
‘cooperation’ or to the role of Member States. Thus, the idea to foster cooperation 
with third countries and competent international organizations returns in fields of 
education and sport (Art. 165(3) TFEU), vocational training (Art. 166(3) TFEU), 
culture (Art. 167(3) TFEU) and public health (Art. 168(3) TFEU). A similar promotion 
of cooperation with other international organizations is mentioned in relation to social 
policy (Art. 156 TFEU) and cooperation in Union research, technological 
development and demonstration (Art. 180(b) TFEU). In addition, the Union’s foreign 
and security policy includes a number of rules on the way in which the EU wishes to 
present itself in international organizations, including the representation by the High 
Representative (Art. 27(2) TEU), the cooperation between diplomatic missions of the 
Member States and the Union delegations (Art. 33 and 35 TEU), the coordination of 
Member States’ actions (Art. 34 TEU) and the general competence to conclude 
international agreements with international organizations in the area of CFSP (Art. 37 
TEU). 
  
Finally, the EU Treaties present the United Nations and its Charter as the guiding 
legal framework for the EU in its external relations. Article 3(5) TEU mentions 
“respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” as part of the “the strict 
observance and the development of international law” which are to be pursued by the 
EU. Similar wordings reappear in Article 21 TEU of the general provisions on the 
Union’s external action. In fact, the promotion of “multilateral solutions to common 
problems” should be done “in particular in the framework of the United Nations”.35 
Finally, as reflected in the Preamble to the TFEU, UN law not only guides the 
external relations of the Union, but also its internal relation with its overseas 
countries. The Member States announced that they intent to “confirm the solidarity 
which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the 
development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” 
Article 42(1) TEU provides that the Union may use its civilian and military assets 
missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security, and again this should be done “in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter.” In fact, the Treaties foresee the possibility 
of EU missions operating in a UN framework. The preamble of Protocol 10 to the 
Treaties refers to the fact that “the United Nations Organisation may request the 
Union's assistance for the urgent implementation of missions undertaken under 
Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter.” Similarly, UN law forms the legal 
framework for actions in relation to the new collective defence obligation in Article 
42(7) TEU: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all 
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the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
[the provision on (collective) self-defence].” 
The attention to the United Nations and its principles in the EU treaties is thus 
overwhelming. In fact, the United Nations is referred to 19 times in the current EU 
treaties (including the Protocols and Declarations). Irrespective of the CJEU’s 
judgment in the Kadi cases, which seemed to emphasise the Union’s own 
principles,36 the EU member states which signed off on the Lisbon Treaty obviously 
regard many of the EU's actions as being part of a global governance programme. 
With a view to the legal regime governing the EU-UN relations, one may conclude 
that most of the provisions aim to regulate EU policy in a substantive, rather than an 
institutional manner. EU foreign policy is to take place within the limits set by UN law. 
This holds true for external relations in general, and for CFSP, CSDP, and 
development cooperation in particular. Much less the treaties offer institutional 
improvements to allow the EU and the UN to become ‘partners in multilateralism’.37 
 
4. The Influence of International Decisions on the EU: Empirical Evidence 
 
Given these extensive references in the EU treaties to international organizations 
(indicating even an occasional voluntary dependence of the EU on international 
decisions), the question is to which extent decisions of these organizations actually 
impact the EU. Over the years many empirical case studies revealed an influence of 
international organizations on the EU, including a possibility that international 
organizations have been ‘teaching’ the European Union, in particular in areas where 
it was a relative newcomer (such as health (the WHO), the monetary and financial 
system (IMF, and World Bank) or international security (NATO)).38 Research – 
including a project lead by the present authors39 – has furthermore shown that we 
also witness a normative influence of international organizations on the EU legal 
order and that this may put the cherished ‘autonomy’ of that order into perspective.40 
The influence of international norms varies considerably and reflects the constant 
struggle between an openness to international law and norms developed at the 
international level and the idea of an autonomous legal order that is there for the 
Court to preserve. Obviously, ‘influence’ is a matter of degree and here we use it to 
denote the effect of norms created in or by international organisations on EU norms. 
The issue can be approached from two sides: the international organization in 
question should have the capacity or power to exercise its influence (there has to be 
an institutional and substantive link), and the EU must be willing or compelled to 
‘receive’ the influence. Influence is not a legal concept and lawyers are not used to 
work with it (perhaps because it would imply the actual ‘measuring’ of effects – 
something that is also beyond the scope of the present Paper). In their recent book, 
Oriol Costa and Knud Erik Jørgensen reveal that “under certain circumstances 
international institutions [indeed] shape both policies and policy-making processes, 
even in ways sometimes unintended by the EU, or undesired by some member 
states”.41 They point to the fact that in IR-theory different ‘mechanisms’ to exert 
influence have been noticed, which may (1) provide opportunities or constraints to 
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actors, (2) change their ability to influence decision-making by changing the 
distribution of power, (3) establishing or spreading norms and rules, or (4) creating 
path dependencies. The emerging picture is a complex set of formal and (sometimes 
very subtle) informal ways in which international organizations (and other multilateral 
fora) influence the EU. The degree of influence may then also depend on the 
‘institutional strength’ of the international organization. Some research showed that 
“international institutions embodied in toothless non-binding agreements should have 
less influence on the EU then fully-fledged international institutions including binding 
treaties and meetings of regular fora.”42 At the same time, it is well-known that 
‘domestic conditions’ are an important factor for the degree of influence.43 
In the end, IR-theory teaches us that the different mechanisms and degrees of 
influence may have different consequences. Apart from ‘normative influence’, it is 
equally possible to find elements of ‘institutional consequences’, including the role 
EU and Member State actors can play in international institutions and the way in 
which formal decision-making processes are used in practice. There is indeed an 
interaction between the EU and many international organizations, underlining the 
coming of age of the European Union as a polity. Whereas for an international 
organization as the EU44 stressing its autonomy is necessary to establish its position 
both vis-à-vis its own Member states and in the global legal order, its further 
development sets the limits to that autonomy. In many policy areas the EU has 
become a global player and everything it does cannot be disconnected for normative 
processes that take place in other international organizations. This process does 
come with the same tension that sovereign states face, i.e. how to square the 
preservation of one’s institutional and constitutional values with accepting a certain 
dependence of the outside world. 
More legally oriented research seems to support the findings of political scientists 
and IR-theorists: international decisions also normatively influence the creation and 
interpretation of EU decisions,45 and – more generally – global, EU and domestic 
norms are increasingly interconnected.46  A recent research project reveals that  the 
influence of international norms varies considerably and reflects the constant struggle 
between an openness to international law and norms developed at the international 
level and the idea of an autonomous legal order that is there for the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) to preserve. 47 The picture emerging from this study is a complex 
set of formal and (sometimes very subtle) informal ways in which international 
organizations and other multilateral fora influence the EU. The degree of the 
normative influence of international bodies on the EU and its legal order depends on 
a raft of factors, ranging from the binding obligations resulting from EU membership 
and full participation in other international organizations, to the voluntary reception or 
outright rejection of international norms by the EU legislator and Court of Justice. At 
the same time, ‘domestic conditions’ are also an important factor for the degree of 
influence. Whereas the EU is a unique and very complex legal construction, the 
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separateness of the EU both from national and international law are still propagated 
by the Court of Justice’s autonomous interpretation of EU law, and its exclusive 
jurisdiction therein. In view of globalisation’s growing interconnectedness between all 
sorts of subjects of international law, and the waning economic and financial power of 
the European Union on the international plane, the Court’s refusal to take account of 
international law in order to protect the unity of the internal market becomes 
increasingly untenable. This is all the more so because the Court’s recently displayed 
attitude towards the reception of international law in the EU legal order forms an 
impediment to meeting the EU’s constitutional duties in its relations with the wider 
world, most notably full respect for international law, whether this emanates from 
international organizations with legal personality or less institutionalised international 
regimes. 
There is thus empirical evidence of the intense legal interactions between the EU and 
a representative body of international institutions and we will mention some key 
examples, without attempting to be exhaustive, and mainly drawing on an earlier 
research project on this topic led by the present authors.48 The influence of Security 
Council resolutions has been given abundant attention in relation to the Kadi saga. 
And will for that reason not be dealt with extensively here.49 But also other rules, 
standards, codes of conduct, guidelines, principles, recommendations and best 
practices developed within a variety of international organizations and bodies 
influence the development of EU law, even if they are not strictly legally binding upon 
the Union. Thus, norms developed within several bodies, be it within the UN family 
such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the World Health Organization (WHO), or the OECD, the G20 and 
some of the machinery this ‘international regime’ has brought to life, such as the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), and specific bodies bringing together financial 
watchdogs like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) – have been dealt 
with within the EU legislature and/or judiciary. As it happens, the Union seems to 
have a somewhat ambivalent relationship with international bodies and the numerous 
norms they develop. The EU legislature demonstrates openness towards these 
norms and often directly refers to the international processes that led to their 
development. This is the case especially where the EU is represented in the 
international body at hand, helps to shape the rules, and where the EU has an 
interest in seeing them implemented. Indeed, much of the EU’s recent legislation in 
financial governance explicitly mentions commitments made at the international level, 
in particular within the G20. In case law, however, the Court of Justice of the EU has 
rarely relied on norms emanating from these bodies in a substantive fashion. While 
the CJEU sometimes refers to such norms, it has often given a more autonomous 
meaning to the EU rules concerned. 50 
An analysis of the impact of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the EU legal order, reveals that the 
Court has so far not accepted that it must be bound by the decisions of any external 
(quasi-)judicial body. Yet, both EU law (Article 6(3) TEU) and the status of the ECHR 
(a “constitutional instrument of European public order”) can be cited in support of the 
argument that the decisions of the ECtHR require and deserve greater force than the 
decisions of other external (quasi-)judicial bodies, including the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies. With the Member States enjoying the convenience, the EU has 
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taken over adjudication in the WTO. Eckes has observed that the negotiations 
surrounding the accession of the EU to the ECHR provide the most recent example 
where the EU’s autonomy concern has posed and will continue to pose many 
questions.51 More in general a number of Council of Europe conventions are today 
part of the EU’s acquis in the field of freedom, security and justice (e.g., the 2008 
Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, and the 2000 Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union aimed at supplementing and facilitating the application, between the EU 
Member States, of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters).52 
The influence of the WTO on the EU cannot be understated. WTO primary and 
secondary law have had a considerable influence on EU primary and secondary law 
and their interpretation. Much of the EU's primary law on the free circulation of goods 
has been inspired by GATT 1947, and the integration of new trade subjects into the 
WTO 1994 triggered a constitutional process of expanding the EU's exclusive powers 
concerning commercial policy. Moreover, many pieces of secondary EU legislation 
either transpose WTO norms or have been modified to bring them into line with world 
trade standards after adverse WTO judicial decisions. The underlying reason for this 
openness may be that the EU's political institutions expect WTO rules in this area to 
have been largely influenced by its own practice on the matter and are thus 
considered to be fully legitimate.53 
While IMF law as such has a limited influence on EU law in the sense of the IMF’s 
power to affect EU law, it nevertheless impacts EU law, both directly and indirectly. 
First, EU jurisprudence recognises that under certain circumstances obligations 
under multilateral treaties, such as the IMF’s Articles – to which all EU Member 
States are parties but the EU is not – may have a direct binding effect on the EU, to 
the extent that the EU assumes the Member States’ competences under the TFEU 
related to these obligations. Second, the exercise of EU Member States’ rights and 
obligations under the IMF’s Articles indirectly affects the EU and EU law. This is 
because the EU has assumed from, or shares with, EU Member States certain 
competences relevant to the IMF’s Articles. Third, the IMF and the EU also interact in 
other areas of common interest, thereby mutually influencing policy positions and 
leading to the use of similar concepts in their respective policies and laws. One 
example concerns the two organizations’ surveillance, the IMF under Article IV of its 
Articles and the EU under a number of procedural frameworks, such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Similarly, IMF policy positions on collective action clauses have 
also impacted EU policy decisions. The EU’s legal order is thus rather open to the 
influence by IMF law.54 
Another example is formed by the World Intellectual Property Organization. The EU 
is not a member of the WIPO, whereas all its Member States are. Yet, in light of the 
strong link between the EU and WIPO, the autonomy of the EU in matters of 
intellectual property is relative. The European Union is among the most active 
international organizations at WIPO. The EU has been given either member or 
observer status by WIPO members for several internationally binding agreements 
and within various decision-making bodies. WIPO’s norms, principles and practices 
are increasingly relevant to the development of intellectual property law within the EU 
legal order. Historically, the EU has incorporated both binding and non-binding 
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principles created via the WIPO mechanism. Whereas the WIPO norm-making 
process heavily influences the body and framework of intellectual property law in the 
EU, WIPO norms do not have independent normative value within the EU. The EU is 
not bound by new or evolving intellectual property principles unless, by virtue of its 
own authority, it chooses to be. Yet, there is clear evidence that the EU is able to act 
unilaterally to accept or discard intellectual property norms in its legal order.55 
Turning to another specialised agency of the United Nations, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), it has been observed that, over time, the relationship 
between the two international organizations has shifted from one between equal 
partners to a more hierarchical one between an organization and one of its members. 
It is exactly because the EU is a full member of the FAO that it is not wholly 
unsurprising to find that the EU legal order reveals substantial FAO influence, notably 
in five policy fields: fisheries, food law, animal health, international food security and 
forestry. Yet, the extent of these effects is ultimately determined by the EU legislator 
and judiciary. The normative impact of the FAO on the EU legal order manifests itself 
chiefly in terms of the direct incorporation of FAO standards in EU secondary 
legislation and in references to FAO standards in both EU policy instruments and the 
case law of the CJEU. In food law and animal health, the influence of the FAO is 
strongest in internal EU rules, whereas in the fields of fisheries, international food 
security and forestry, FAO influence is more prominent in external EU policies and 
actions.56 
Notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdiction of the CJEU does not extend to Title V of 
the EU Treaty to the same extent as to other policy areas, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that NATO’s impact on the European Union’s institutional design, 
policy-making and operational experience gathering in the field of security and 
defence has been “fundamental”, even if only few traces of NATO are to be found in 
EU primary law. It is especially on the operational side, the raison d’être of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy, that NATO’s impact has been instrumental.57 
This is evidenced most vividly by the use, however limited in number, of the so-called 
‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, which have enabled the European Union to borrow NATO 
assets and capabilities in order to launch its first-ever military mission in 2003 
(Proxima in Macedonia) and to continue its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR 
Althea). Similarly, it has been noted that also in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) the EU is bound to respect the norms stemming from international 
organizations. Yet, while the EU legal order is open to external normative influences, 
only a couple of international organizations currently influence the development of 
the AFSJ. The most prominent examples are the United Nations and the Council of 
Europe, which muster the 1951 Geneva Convention on asylum seekers and refugees 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, respectively.58 
Overall, studies over the past years have revealed an impact of many international 
decisions on the EU. These decisions may be taken by both formal international 
organizations and more ‘informal’ transnational, regulatory or treaty bodies.59 Given 
this influence, the question is how we should assess the legal status of these 
decisions in the EU legal order. 
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5. The Legal Status of International Decisions in the EU Legal Order 
 
It was in the Haegeman case60 that the Court presented the famous phrase that 
international agreements concluded by the European Union form “an integral part of 
Union law”. In 2009, the American Air Transport Association and others brought 
judicial review proceedings asking the referring court to quash the measures 
implementing the directive in the United Kingdom.61 In support of their action, they 
pleaded that that directive was unlawful in the light of international treaty law and 
customary international law. In its ruling, the Court nicely summarised the main 
principles related to the effect of international law in the EU legal order. First of all, 
the Court confirmed that the EU is in principle bound by international law. This has 
indeed been standard case law ever since the International Fruit Company case in 
1972.62 Second, the Court can examine the validity of an act of European Union law 
in the light of an international treaty only where the nature and the broad logic of the 
latter do not preclude this.63 Finally, where the nature and the broad logic of the 
treaty in question permit the validity of the act of European Union law to be reviewed 
in the light of the provisions of that treaty, it is also necessary that the provisions of 
that treaty which are relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the act of 
European Union law appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise.64 
The question of whether this status of international law is restricted to international 
agreements, or also extends to decisions of international organizations, has been 
less frequently discussed. Yet, as rightfully stated by Martenczuk, “international 
agreements […] often establish a common institutional framework, including the 
creation of joint bodies authorized to take decisions with bring effect for the parties.”65 
Indeed, one starting point is formed by ‘secondary international law’ deriving from 
international agreements such as Association Council decisions. In Sevince – 
concerning the rights of Turkish workers under Decision 2/76 and 1/80 of the EC-
Turkey Association Council – the Court held that these decisions are also to be seen 
as forming part of the EU’s legal order and may even have direct effect.66 Earlier, the 
Court already recognised the legal effect of decisions of the same Association 
Council, without being explicit on the actual legal status.67 And, in fact in Greece v. 
Commission, the Court already used Haegeman-like language: “since it is directly 
connected with the Association Agreement, Decision No. 2/80 forms, from the entry 
into force an integral part of the Community legal system”.68 
While one could argue that Association Agreements and their Councils and 
comparable bodies are quite directly connected to the EU’s legal order on the basis 
of their very nature, there are no reasons to limit this reasoning that they constitute 
international bodies (especially when seen from the perspective of the third country) 
to the Association regimes. In Opinion 1/76, in relation to the question as to whether 
                                                          
60
 Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State. 
61
 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines Inc., 
United Airlines Inc. v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. 
62
 Joined cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit. 
63
 See also Joined Cases C‑ 120/06 P and C‑ 121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and 
Commission, par. 110. 
64
 Case C-344/04, Queen on the application of International Air Transport Association v. Department for 
Transport (IATA and ELFAA), par. 39, and Intertanko (op.cit.), par. 45. 
65
 B. Martenczuk, op.cit., at 142. 
66
 See for instance: Case C-192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie. Cf. also Case C-188/91, 
Deutsche 
Shell, [1993] ECR I-363, para 17. Cf. also Nanette A.E.M. Neuwahl, 'The European Parliament and 
Association Council Decisions: The example of Decision 1/95 of the EC/Turkey Association Council' 
(1996) 33 CMLR, pp. 51–68. 
67
 Case 204/86, Greece v. Council [1988] ECR 5323. 
68
 Case 30/88, Greece v. Commission [1989] ECR 3711. 
an agreement ‘establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’ is 
compatible with the provisions of the Treaty, the Court argued:  
 
“the Community is […] not only entitled to enter into contractual relations with a third country in 
this connexion but also has the power, while observing the provisions of the Treaty, to 
cooperate with that country in setting up an appropriate organism such as the public 
international institution which it is proposed to establish under the name of the ‘European 
laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’”.69 
 
The Court explicitly added that the ‘organism’ may be given “appropriate powers of 
decision”.70 In subsequent situations, such as the establishment and joining of the EU 
(at the time the EC) of the WTO71, the Court underlined this view. The current 
Treaties do not provide for a specific procedure for agreements to establish or join 
international organizations, which implies that the general rules of Article 218 TFEU 
apply. Indeed Article 218(1) TFEU refers to “agreements between the Union and third 
countries or international organisations” and Article 218(6)(a)(iii) TFEU mentions 
“agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures” (as one of the cases requiring the consent of the European 
Parliament).72 Examples include bilateral cooperation agreements, such as 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, but also other types of agreements which 
include the establishment of bodies with decision-making powers, such as the ones 
dealing with the mutual recognition of technical standards (concluded for instance 
with the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Bodies are furthermore 
established by for instance the European Economic Area, the Energy Charter Treaty, 
the Energy Community Treaty and the European Common Aviation Area or on the 
basis of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).73 The latter often use the 
terms Conference of Parties (COPs) or Meeting of Parties (MOPs) to refer to the 
bodies taking the decisions in the framework of MEAs.74 While there is no consensus 
on whether COPs and MOPs could qualify as international organizations, “the fact 
remains that at the same time COPs/MOPs have been endowed with the 
competence to adopt binding decisions.”75 Or, as another observer held: “Like 
treaties, they compromise a specific normative framework of prescriptions that are 
particularly suitable to organizing internationally coordinated behaviour within a 
limited issue-area. Like international organizations, they provide a permanent 
mechanism for changing these normative prescriptions.”76 
  
The link with ‘international agreements’ remains nevertheless important. In the cases 
on decisions by Association Councils, the Court already pointed to the need for these 
decisions to be “directly connected’ with the underlying international agreement. And 
in the absence of any specific provisions on decisions of international organizations, 
it would indeed be Article 218 TFEU that seems to offer the appropriate framework. 
The term ‘international agreements’ was broadly defined by the Court as to include 
“any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which has 
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binding force, whatever its form or designation”.77 The Court made this assessment 
in the framework of an Article 218(11) TFEU procedure on the basis of which “A 
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain 
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is 
compatible with the Treaties.” It would seem that in its Opinion the Court should also 
take the possible decisions to be adopted by bodies established by international 
agreements into account.78 
  
Apart from the above-mentioned references to international bodies in Article 218, 
paragraph 9 is perhaps even more explicit: 
 
“The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an 
agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up 
by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, with the 
exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement.” 
 
While the status of international decisions is still not clear from this provision, at least 
‘bodies set up by an agreement’ are mentioned. More importantly however is that 
when introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the procedure only applied to 
establishing the positions to be adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up 
by an association agreement. The Nice Treaty extended the scope of application of 
the provision concerned to cover decisions having legal effects of bodies set up by 
any international agreement. It has been argued that “the Purpose of the introduction 
of this simplified decision-making procedure was presumably to take account of the 
case law of the Court of Justice according to which the status and effects, in the 
Union legal order, of such decisions of organs created by an international agreement 
concluded by the Community were essentially the same as those of the agreement 
itself.”79 Furthermore, there do not seem to be reasons to limit this to treaty bodies 
set up by multilateral conventions, in which case the provision would also apply to 
‘regular’ international organizations. Indeed, as argued by Heliskoski, Article 218(9)’s 
main raison d’être may flow from the very fact “that decisions of such bodies could 
have legal effects – including direct effect and primacy over secondary legislation – 
within the Union legal order without any subsequent act of adoption by the Union’s 
institutions”.80 
Yet, while international organizations are (by definition) established on the basis of 
an international (constitutive) agreement, the EU is not always a party to that 
agreement, in which case the provisions in Article 218 would not apply and the 
source for the binding character of decisions on the Union should be found 
elsewhere. In the CITES case, for instance, the Commission sought the annulment of 
the decision of the Council establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of the 
European Community with regard to certain proposals submitted at a meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).81 The Union is not a contracting party to 
CITES; it has observer status at Conferences of the Parties. However, since 1982 it 
has autonomously adopted measures designed to implement within the Union the 
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obligations of the Member States deriving from CITES. For the purpose of the 
present contribution the CITES case is also helpful as it clarifies that the Conference 
of the Parties (COPs) of CITES is empowered to adopt amendments to the 
Appendices to the Convention, the entry into force of which is not subject to 
ratification, and that the decisions of the COPs are clearly capable of producing legal 
effects not only with regard to the Member States as parties to CITES but also within 
the Union’s legal order. Yet, the Court did not deal with the content of decisions, or 
their status and effect in Union law, although it has rightfully been argued that “the 
nature and effects of a decision to be taken by an international decision-making body 
should […] play a crucial role in determining whether the establishment of the 
position of the Union in such a body should be conceived of as having legal effects in 
the Union legal order.”82  
In a currently pending case, the Court will have a chance to clarify the scope of 
Article 218(9). The case relates to decisions taken by the International Organization 
for Wine and Vine (IOV),of which the EU is not a member, but several of its Member 
States are. Given the EU’s competences in the field, its intention is to upgrade its 
position in the IOV.  On 19 June 2012, the Council by qualified majority with 
Germany voting against, adopted a decision establishing an EU position to be 
adopted in the OIV   on the basis of Articles 43 and 218(9) TFEU. In the meantime, 
Germany (itself a member of the IOV) has brought an action for annulment against 
that decision challenging Article 218(9) TFEU as the correct legal basis for the 
adoption of the decision.  Germany argues that Article 218(9) TFEU concerns only 
the adoption of the positions of the Union in bodies set up by international 
agreements of which the Union is a member. By contrast, Article 218(9) TFEU 
cannot be applied in relation to the representation of the Member States in bodies of 
international organisations in which only the Member States participate by virtue of 
separate international treaties. Furthermore, Germany takes the view that Article 
218(9) TFEU covers only “acts having legal effects”, meaning acts binding under 
international law, and that OIV resolutions are not acts in that sense. Finally, 
Germany argues that no other legal basis for the adoption of the Council decision is 
apparent.  
On 29 April 2014 Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered his Opinion  and argued 
that Article 218(9) TFEU can only apply to bodies established by agreements to 
which the Union is a party. His arguments relate to the fact that the provisions is 
clearly part of Title V (‘International Agreements’) of Part Five (‘The Union’s External 
Action’) of the TFEU on international agreements concluded by the EU.  
Furthermore, the question is how to interpret the phrase “acts having legal effects” in 
Article 218(9). Germany takes the view that only decisions of an international 
organisation which are binding in international law may be regarded as acts ‘having 
legal effects’. The Council and the Commission, on the other hand, consider that 
decisions of an international organisation which are incorporated into EU law by 
dynamic reference also have legal effects within the meaning of the contested 
provision. They further argue that even minor effects which a non-binding decision 
produces in international law are sufficient for that decision to be recognised as 
having legal effects. A fact is that over the years EU secondary legislation has 
contained dynamic references to the OIV resolutions. On the basis of a textual, 
contextual and teleological interpretation the AG concludes that “The phrase ‘having 
legal effects’ in Article 218(9) TFEU serves to indicate that the acts in question must 
have binding force in international law.”  In its final conclusion the AG holds that 
Article 218(9) TFEU does not therefore provide a suitable legal basis for the decision 
in the present case. Obviously, we will have to wait whether the Court will follow this 
reasoning, but the AG seems to use a solid reasoning. An interesting element is also 
that Article 8 of the OIV Agreement allows international organizations to become a 
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member of the organization, but so far EU Council Members have not been able to 
reach consensus on this. 
What does this tell us about the status of international decisions in the EU legal 
order? Can we establish a link with Article 216(2) TFEU, on the basis of which 
“Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union 
and on its Member States.”? The close connection which is visible both in the 
(modified) treaty provisions and in case law between ‘international agreements’ and 
‘decisions made by bodies based on international agreements’ indeed points to this 
presumption.83 Following Martenczuk: “to the extent that decisions of bodies 
established by international law have been validly incorporated into Union law, they 
are part of the Union legal order” and hence their uniform interpretation and 
application throughout the Union’s legal order is to be ensured,84 in principle 
irrespective of their direct effect.85 Allegedly this would imply the Court’s jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the decisions (as was confirmed for 
Association Council decisions in Sevince86). While Article 267 TFEU limits the 
preliminary procedure to “the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union” and ‘acts of other international bodies’ are 
not included,87 it may be argued that the latter are a logical consequence of an earlier 
‘act of the institutions’. In addition, sometimes international decisions enter the EU 
legal order only after a decision to that end was adopted by the EU institutions.88 
Along the same lines the infringement procedure (Article 258 TFEU) applies mutatis 
mutandis. 
Yet, even if ‘Decisions based on Agreements concluded by the Union are binding 
upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States’, what then about 
decisions by other international bodies? While in a ‘CITES-situation’ the Union may 
have adopted the legal effects of decisions of the COPs or another international 
body, it would be difficult to provide a general answer. Decisions by international 
organizations of which the Union is not a member or of bodies based on international 
agreements to which the EU is not a party (or of international bodies not based on an 
international agreement at all) can have legal effects in the sense that they may 
‘influence’ EU decision-making, but they would need to be binding on the Union to 
actually enjoy the hierarchically higher status comparable to international agreements 
in order to be able to set aside existing Union law. Conceptually speaking, it does not 
make any difference if an international norm that arrives at the border of the EU legal 
order is generated by an international organization or whether it belongs to a less 
organized body of public international law. In order to have an impact on the EU legal 
order, all international norms will, regardless of their origins, have to be binding on 
the EU. Furthermore, the nature and the broad logic of these international norms 
should not preclude this binding force.89  
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6. Concluding Observations 
 
The question of the status of decisions by international organizations and other 
bodies (termed ‘international decisions’ in this contribution) in the Union’s legal order 
has gained importance. First of all international organizations changed from 
international frameworks for cooperation to more ‘autonomous’ norm-creating 
international bodies. Secondly, there has been a proliferation of international norm-
creating and/or regulatory bodies, alongside the already existing formal international 
governmental organizations. Thirdly, the decisions of all these international bodies 
are more and more influencing each other, resulting in a ‘global normative web’ that 
also impacts the European Union.  
The status of these international decisions in the EU legal order is not as clearly 
regulated or clarified as the status of international agreements and customary law. 
Yet, this Paper shows that there are good reasons to follow the Haegeman-doctrine 
and start from the presumption that international decisions form ‘an integral part of 
EU law’. In fact, the doctrinal analysis of the status of international agreements may 
mutatis mutandis be applied to international decisions, including their position 
‘between primary and secondary law’, keeping in mind that “[w]hilst the EU in 
principle automatically incorporates treaties it concludes into its legal order, it is the 
EU legal order that will ultimately determine the types of internal effect which such 
Agreements can display and, indeed, can potentially deprive them, through ex post 
review, of internal legal effects where they clash with EU primary law.”90 
  
Given the wide range of topics covered by international bodies and the diverging 
legal nature of their decisions, this does not make the overall question raised by this 
contribution any easier to answer. Indeed, the question of the reception of the 
international norms seems to be decisive in establishing their status. This line of 
reasoning points to a more dynamic influence of international law on the EU. Where 
negotiations on international agreements may very well take the ‘primary law’ 
aspects of the agreement into consideration, it is much more difficult to predict any 
‘secondary law’ based on the agreement. Yet, following the interpretation of both the 
treaty provisions and the relevant case law it would be difficult to come to a different 
conclusion. Once the EU has joined an international organization or becomes a party 
to an international agreement on the basis of which international decisions can be 
taken, these decisions not only influence the EU legal order, but – when binding – 
also become an integral part of that order. The presumption suggested above would 
at least hold for decisions of Association Councils (and similar bodies) and for 
decisions of bodies (and conferences of state parties) based on agreements to which 
the Union is a party or where it has accepted the legal effects through internal 
legislation. As such, these decisions may also obtain EU law features such as 
supremacy and possible direct effect – features that they previously did not 
necessarily possess.91 This may even be possible in cases where the EU itself is not 
a member of the particular international organization (such as in the case of the 
ICAO) or treaty regime (CITES). In cases where Member States are not a member of 
an international organization, but the EU is (for instance the regional fisheries 
organizations), the international decisions reach the Member States as (supreme) EU 
law and not as international law of which the status is determined by their national 
constitutions.92 The possible impact of international decisions on fundamental rights, 
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the principles of democracy and rule of law, have been analysed extensively, in 
particular in the context of the Kadi saga. 
The fact remains that, unlike international agreements, international decisions usually 
do not require ratification to enter into force. This may be particularly problematic 
when the notion of ‘international decisions as integral part of EU law’ is combined 
with majority decision-making at the international level, potentially allowing non-EU 
members to create supreme EU law. Again, this issue became apparent in many of 
the anti-terrorism cases. At the same it is clear that in most cases international 
bodies work on the basis of consensus or offer a way to opt out. 
Decisions by international organizations or other international bodies can have legal 
effects in the sense that they may ‘influence’ EU decision-making, but they would 
need to be binding on the Union to actually enjoy the hierarchically higher status 
comparable to international agreements in order to be able to set aside existing EU 
law. Conceptually speaking therefore, it does not make any difference if an 
international norm that arrives at the border of the EU legal order is generated by an 
international organization or whether it belongs to a less organized body of public 
international law. In order to have an impact on the EU legal order, all international 
norms will, regardless of their origins, have to be binding on the EU. 
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